US$ billion At the same time, following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, official aid flows to developing countries have declined somewhat in absolute terms. In relative terms they have shrunk from roughly 56 percent of total net resource flows to about 16 per cent (Figure 2 ).
Two key questions arise from these trends. First, how can shrinking aid flows be best used to support the goal of poverty reduction? Second, does foreign direct investment support sound development, in particular, does it contribute to poverty reduction? 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 US$ billion
Official flows Private flows FDI, growth and poverty reduction. In a nutshell, this paper argues that FDI is a key ingredient for successful economic growth in developing countries. This is because the very essence of economic development is the rapid and efficient transfer and adoption of "best practice" across borders. FDI is particularly well suited to effect this and translate it into broad-based growth, not least by upgrading human capital. As growth is the singlemost important factor affecting poverty reduction, FDI is central to achieving that goal.
FDI and the quality of growth. Beyond promoting growth, FDI has other potent ially desirable features that affect the quality of growth and assist with poverty reduction. First, it helps reduce adverse shocks to the poor resulting from financial instability as during the recent Asian crisis. Second, relative to other forms of promoting private sector investment FDI helps improve corporate governance. In particular, it is not easily subject to asset stripping that may render property rights distribution more unequal. Third, contrary to popular criticism FDI can help improve environmental and labor standards, because foreign investors tend to be concerned about reputation in markets, where high standards are seen as desirable. Finally, FDI generates taxes that support the development of a safety net for the poor. Many foreign investors also invest substantially in community development in areas where they operate and thus in the safety net for the particular area. Very importantly FDI can help improve the management of the social safety net, particularly service delivery to the poor, for example, water supply.
Pre -conditions for successful FDI. To achieve these positive outcomes for poverty reduction, the environment in which foreign investors operate needs to be "right". Otherwise popular criticism of various forms of exploitation practiced by foreign investors may well be right. The existence of an equal and competitive playing field without special protection for foreign or domestic investors is crucial. The regulations governing foreign investors need to be reasonable ? not unduly burdensome and not arbitrary.
FDI -no panacea but an integral part of the poverty reduction toolkit. This positive appraisal of the impact of FDI on poverty reduction will not easily be shared by those who believe that the current distribution of assets and incomes in the world needs to be rendered drastically more equal. FDI will, indeed, not automatically reduce income inequality. Also FDI will not deal with all dimensions of poverty. It will mainly promote growth and thereby reduce income poverty. However, there appear to be few other basic policies that promise to do systematically more for improving the material well-being of the poor. The key alternative approaches that might direct more of the fruits of growth to the poor are governme nt-led programs that improve social safety nets and explicitly redistribute assets and income. But these are not alternatives to sensible growth-oriented policies. They are complements. Growth is needed to fund these programs. Moreover, the delivery of social services to the poor -from insurance schemes to access to basic services such as water and energy -can clearly benefit from reliance on foreign investors. However we may look at it -among the tools available -FDI remains among the most effective ones in the fight against poverty. Hence, the wide agreement among analysts about the usefulness of FDI, including prominent critics of "growth-first" policies such as Joseph Stiglitz, the former Chief Economist of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998b) .
II. THE POTENTIAL OF FDI FOR POVERTY REDUCTION

A. FDI and growth
Cross border transfer of best practice and acceleration of growth. The key to economic development is the transfer and adoption of best practice across borders. Before the industrial revo lution it took some 350 years for income per capita to double in Europe (Crafts, 2000) . As the industrial revolution accelerated in the 19 th century it took the lead country, Britain, over 60 years to double per capita income. Towards the end of the 20 th century several rather diverse countries managed to double per capita income in just about 10 years -including, for example, Botswana, Chile, China, Ireland, Japan and Thailand. Such rapid growth is now possible for those developing economies that are able to import and imitate technical and organizational innovations from the world's leading countries. Growth of this rapid type makes it possible for the first time in history to propel people from poverty to a reasonably comfortable life within a single life span. Indeed, it is this possibility of near-term poverty eradication that gives rise to both hope about the possibilities and frustration about the shortcomings in the fight against poverty.
FDI -the key mechanism to transfer best practice across borders. Best practice may be transmitted across borders by various mechanisms. Foreign buyers of exports may provide the demand for upgrading, as well as some level of technical assistance to domestic firms (Lim and Fong, 1982; Johansson and Nilsson, 1997) . Imported capital goods may embody improved technology. Technology licensing allows countries to acquire innovations. Expatriates transmit knowledge. Yet, arguably the most effective means of transferring best practice is FDI. Foreign investment tends to package and integrate elements from all of the above mechanisms. A few countries, essentially Japan and Korea, have been able to grow rapidly with minimal reliance on FDI. Many countries have attempted to imitate the Japanese or Korean model, but with limited success. De facto, most other fast-growing countries have relied heavily on FDI (for example Chile, China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). Most astonishingly, Irelanddespite being a relatively advanced country -has managed to grow at some 8 per cent per year for most of the 1990s due in large part to effective attraction and deployment of foreign investment. This is not to say that FDI is all it takes to achieve rapid growth, but it appears that FDI is a key ingredient.
Many studies show that FDI tends to raise productivity in the recipient economy (Annex 1). Clearly, the key mechanism is the adoption of managerial and technical best practice from abroad. There is a large number of ways by which productivity is raised ranging from better worker training, via improved management methods, to deployment of advanced technology. Yet, it appears that no study explicitly tests, which mechanism for the cross-border transmission of best practice performs best and under what circumstances. However, a few studies have investigated whether firms with foreign investors raise productivity more than other firms. To the extent that such studies show that foreignowned firms outperform domestic ones, this suggests that they constitute the better overall mechanism to improve management and technology. For example, foreign investment has raised the productivity of small and medium-sized firms in Venezuela more than that of domestically-owned firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) . In the Czech Republic foreign owned firms out-performed joint ventures with foreign partners, which in turn outperformed locally-owned firms (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998) . In Africa, firms with majority foreign ownership perform better than others (Ramachandran and Shah, 1997) .
The role of FDI in the domestic diffusion of best practice. The ultimate impact of foreign investment on domestic growth depends not only on the performance of foreignowned firms, but also on the diffusion of new practices through the economy. Several studies show that effective diffusion is possible and works, for example, through subcontracting arrangements. A study for Malaysia documents that subcontracting for foreign firms helped almost double the productivity of domestic supplier firms (Batra and Tan, 2000) .
Overall, the diffusion of best practice in the domestic economy depends on the way domestic markets work, irrespective of the nationality of owners. Surprisingly, the way in which markets really work at the firm level has become a matter of detailed empirical economic analysis only during the 1990s. As usual the most detailed studies are for the United States and are summarized in Caves (1998) . However, recently a series of studies have also tackled markets in developing countries, particularly Africa. 1 The general picture is as follows. All markets or individual sectors consist of a mix of small and large firms. A large number of small and medium-sized firms (up to 500 employees) tends to account for the majority of employment. Among such small firms turnover is high. Between 5 and 20 per cent enter and exit the market each year. Typically new entrants are a little more productive than those leaving the market. A few firms grow and become large. Large firms tend to be most productive, last longest and pay the highest wages (Caves, 1998; Tybout, 2000) .
In growing economies, the average firm size increases and with it productivity and wages. This reflects a more sophisticated division of labor, characterized by complex subcontracting arrangements and industrial "clusters" or effective cities, which are after all the most efficient business "incubators". Larger firms tend to be at the apex of subcontracting chains. Likewise, larger firms are often key to the development of clusters (Iqbal and Urata, forthcoming). Larger firms provide credit to subcontractors as well as technical assistance. Particularly where financial markets are not very well developed and where politically-not-well-connected firms are rationed out of the market, large firms may constitute the key channel to access credit. There is thus a clear symbiosis between large, and small and medium sized firms, with the one dependent on the other.
How does FDI come into this picture? Typically, foreign entrants are larger and more productive than domestic firms in developing countries. They tend to produce higher quality goods and services and export relatively more. By relying on foreign investment, countries can "import" such larger, more productive firms and stimulate productivity improvements throughout the economy. De facto, countries can use such foreign firms as catalysts that allow them to leapfrog stages in the development of local firms. FDI can thus speed up the structural shift in the economy that allows a country to catch-up with advanced economies. From this perspective sound policies that support FDI also are among the best ways to develop domestic small and medium-sized companies.
B.
FDI and poverty reduction.
Growth and poverty reduction. Economic growth remains a necessary ingredient for poverty reduction. Recent studies suggest that growth tends to lift the incomes of the poor proportionately with overall growth (Dollar and Kraay, 2000) . FDI as a key vehicle to generate growth is thus a most important ingredient for poverty reduction.
Whether the potential for domestic diffusion of best practice can be exploited depends on the absorption capacity of the host economy. Adequate levels of education and infrastructure are required to fully benefit from FDI (Borenzstein, De Gregoria and Lee, 1998) as well as competition in domestic markets (Bromstrom and Kokko, 1996) . FDI and the quality of growth. While on average growth benefits the poor, there are a number of countries where this has not happened (World Bank, 2000c ). Yet, there is no clear recipe for translating growth into poverty reduction for all country cases. Different countries may well require somewhat different approaches to ensure that growth leads to poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000c) . In the following it is argued that FDI can actually do more than just generate growth. FDI has the potential to improve the quality of growth by
• reducing the volatility of capital flows and incomes
• improving asset and income distribution at the time of privatization • helping improve social and environmental standards
• helping improve social safety nets and basic services for the poor FDI thus also belongs in the toolkit for poverty reduction in countries where simple reliance on "trickle down" does not work.
Protecting the poor from bad investment decisions and financial volatility.
While foreign investment can be critical for rapid growth, critics fear that the gains from productivity improvements are transferred abroad. However, this is not the case when foreign investors operate under competitive conditions. Under such conditions foreign investors can only expect to obtain a normal return on capital. As in any competitive market some will make big profits and others small ones or losses. On average they will tend to earn just the cost of capital. Indeed, overall countries face a relatively competitive market for foreign investment. For example they have the choice to import capital via bank lending and import technology via licensing -the Korean strategy. The net cost would be interest payments plus license fees. Alternatively, countries can attract foreign investment and allow payment of dividends. Already in the 1970s the all-in-cost of one strategy compared to the other appeared quite similar adjusted for the extra risks assumed by foreign equity investors (Vernon, 1977) .
FDI is thus not robbing poor countries. Any strategy that imports funds and technology from abroad requires payments to foreigners -unless pure charity is involved. And rapid development without importing best practice from abroad is not possible. What distinguishes foreign investment from other ways of funding development is not that it is more costly, but the incentive structure for foreign investors. Foreign investment is equity investment. Shareholders gain when projects or firms are successful. They lose when projects or firms fail. Creditors on the other hand often look towards taxpayers to hold them harmless when projects fail. That is clearly so when credits are guaranteed by governments. It is also often so when systemic crises lead to bail-outs of banks, as during the Mexico crisis of 1994/5 and the Asian crises of 1997/8. Foreign investment will by definition not lead to a debt crisis. Debt relief will never be an issue. By the same token, taxpayers in poor countries are not going to suffer from bad decisions by foreign direct investors, because losses will be absorbed by the foreign equity investors.
For the recipient country, the risk profile with FDI is thus better than with debt. By the same token foreign investors have a better incentive to evaluate projects. Once they have made their evaluation, they consequently tend to stay with an investment more consistently than other types of investors. All this is reflected in the stability of foreign investment flows compared to debt and portfolio flows. Clearly FDI flows are most stable (Figure 4) . Given that the poor have suffered disproportionately during currency and financial crises (World Bank, 1999) , reliance on FDI helps protect the poor from the impact of volatility in international financial markets. FDI exposes investors to significant risk which might imply that they shy away from poorer, more turbulent countries (Box 1). Yet, FDI is much less concentrated on a few countries than other private capital flows. FDI is not much more concentrated than the population of the recipient countries (Table 2) .
Among different types of private cross-border financial flows FDI is thus both least volatile, most available to poor countries and least likely to saddle taxpayers in poor countries with unbearable debt service obligations. Among private financial flows FDI is thus most conducive to promote sensible developme nt for the poor.
Improved corporate governance. FDI brings with it the superior incentives of equity investors who try to make sure they invest sensibly. Among forms of cross-border equity investments FDI is also clearly the most efficient form of equity in countries with weak corporate governance rules and practices. Portfolio equity investment by minority shareholders in such countries faces severe risks of expropriation by insiders. For example, voucher privatization to dispersed shareholders in countries such as the Czech Republic or Russia has led to inefficient asset stripping, whereas foreign direct investment in countries like Hungary and Poland led to strong productivity increases (Djankov, 2000) . Figure 5 ).
Source
Countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, which receive most of the FDI inflows in agriculture, light manufacturing, and utilities saw sharp increases in FDI inflows in 1995-1999. In Lesotho, FDI has been undertaken to service the market in neighboring South Africa through the Lesotho Highlands Water project (Table 1) . Those companies that are owned and controlled by foreigners have improved productivity more than those under dispersed ownership, and the distributional implications have probably also been more benign. Asset stripping and other forms of de facto expropriation of minority shareholders under schemes like voucher privatization have tended to lead to a concentration of ownership in the hands of relatively few "oligarchs". Relative to that outcome foreign ownership appears to have led to less unequal ownership among nationals. In addition, dispersed minority shareholdings in firms owned by reputable foreign companies tend to be less plagued by de facto expropriation of minority shareholders. All in all, in countries with weak corporate governance rules and practices foreign investment leads to higher productivity and thus wages than experienced in companies sold to dispersed minority owners. At the same time the distribution of assets among nationals would tend to be more equal. On balance the "oligarchs" benefit less and workers more.
In a way this is a special case of the more general notion that foreign investment tends to go badly together with corrupt practices. This is not because owners and managers of foreign companies are a superior breed of people. Indeed, there are a number of examples where foreign investors are accomplices in corrupt practices or where they work in countries that rank low on corruption indices, particular investors in the extractive industries -whether they themselves are associated with corrupt practices or not. However, as a rule it appears that corrupt environments impose excessive costs of doing business, which foreign companies tend to avoid (Drabek and Payne, 1999; Smarzynska and Wei, 2000) . In a similar vein, where corporate governance is weak foreign investors will not invest unless they have effective control themselves. Hence, the correlation of FDI with relatively less expropriation of minority shareholders and with less corruption (Figure 6 ). Foreign companies have the ability to walk away from corruption precisely because they are less beholden to local vested interests, including governments, than domestic companies. The often deplored erosion of sovereign power due to the ability of foreign companies to choose their preferred domicile is thus revealed to be a positive trait in this case. More generally, the arms-length relationship that foreign investors have with government, where playing fields are even and competition prevails, allow foreign investors to provide opportunities to domestic employees or domestic entrepreneurs that might not have been open to them otherwise. Not being beholden to vested interests and domestic politics as much as locals, foreign investors can and do, for example, open up employment opportunities for women, who might otherwise not have found similarly well paying jobs -notwithstanding the low level of their wages.
Better social and environment standards -race to top. Many critics of FDI allege that multinational companies tend to locate production in countries or regions with low wages, low taxes and weak environmental and social standards. They argue that FDI thus contributes to a "race to the bottom", where countries are forced to lower their standards so as not to lose investment and jobs. It is certainly true that these features of the business environment play a significant role in the decisions of multinationals. However, these items are all just part of the cost side of a business. In the end it is not costs that matter, but profits. Foreign investors balance cost considerations with others that determine the productivity of operations in a particular country.
Overall, FDI flows to places where the net profitability is highest, not where costs are lowest. This is reflected in the basic fact that some three quarters of FDI flows to developed countries and not to low cost developing nations. Among OECD countries the experience of Canada and Switzerland is of interest in this regard, because there labor and capital can move freely across provinces with different tax regimes. Studies suggest that firms and individual taxpayers take the tax burden into account, but that other factors such as the state of infrastructure and other available services are even more significant factors for location decisions (OECD, 1998) . Regarding FDI numerous studies suggest that special tax incentives are not the key to attracting FDI, but that the presence of business opportunities is much more important. Business opportunities are in turn enhanced by the rule of law, the quality of a country's labor force, its infrastructure, and so on.
The other side of the coin is that FDI will only flow into countries with low productivity when wages and other costs are low enough to offset the productivity disadvantage. By the standards of developed economies foreign investors in developing countries pay low wages. Relative to local wages, however, they tend to pay high wages, because foreign companies tend to be more productive than local ones (Graham and Wada, 2000; Mazumdar and Mazaheri, 2000) .
The first round effect of greater foreign investment is often to raise wages of relatively well skilled workers in developing countries. This would increase inequality there. Over time as productivity improvements spread in the recipient economy other people benefit and incomes become again more equal than they would otherwise be. In time, FDI thus helps improve income growth in the low wage countries. To this extent FDI actually helps equalize the global distribution of incomes. For developing countries FDI thus creates a race to the top.
For advanced countries the situation is somewhat different. There the move of companies to low wage locations places downward pressure on the wages of relatively low skilled workers. Only better training and upgrading of jobs will help these workers improve their relative income position. Hence the distrust and dismay, with which many workers in developed countries regard "globalization". Such dismay is a sign that growth that redistributes incomes towards the less well off -as FDI tends to do across countries -easily runs into political constraints, regardless of how many people feel strongly that we need a more equal world. Arguably the relative downward pressure on incomes of workers in high income countries has been one of the major factors behind the disruption of globalization in the beginning of the 20 th century (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999) .
FDI can also create a race to the top for environmental and social standards, for example labor standards in developing countries. Again this is not because managers of multinationals are particularly nice people. A number of detailed cases show that some foreign companies have operated with weak environmental and safety procedures or allowed labor to be treated badly by international or by developed country standards. In this they rarely behave worse than is the general practice in the recipient country (Box 2).
Box 2: Racing to the Bottom?
The 'race to the bottom' hypothesis has been tested in a recent study that analyzes air quality trends in the United States and the three largest recipients of foreign direct investment among the developing countriesChina, Brazil, and Mexico. The evidence shows that instead of racing toward the bottom, major cities in these countries have experienced significant improvements in air quality (see figure 7) . The improvements in the developing countries have occurred in an era of economic liberalization, industrial growth, and rapid expansion of foreign investment flows, thus contradicting the concerns that free trade and capital flows tend to erode global environmental standards. Furthermore, the reduction in air pollution in Mexico City and Los Angeles have occurred despite the fact that these are dominant industrial centers most strongly affected by the North American Free Trade Agreement. 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 Particulate Air Pollution 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Particulate Air Pollution (PM-10 --ug/m3) Los Angeles Chicago Houston Atlanta New York
Evidence from numerous studies suggests that an environmental "race to the bottom" is unlikely for the following reasons:
• Pollution control costs matter to factory owners and managers, but they are generally not a critical factor in location decisions; • Where regulations are weak or absent, NGOs and community groups pursue informal regulation (threat of social, political or physical sanctions) to convince polluters to compensate the community or reduce pollution; • At the national level, governments display a tendency to tighten regulation as incomes grow;
• Local businesses control pollution because abatement reduces costs; and • Due to the scrutiny of consumers and environmental NGOs, multinational firms generally adhere to OECD environmental standards in their developing-country operations.
However, foreign investors can afford to observe better standards than domestic firms can due to higher productivity. Particularly large foreign firms are now increasingly pressured by various civil society groups to improve their environmental and labor practices. When foreign companies sell in competitive markets in rich countries it is relatively easy to boycott them, because consumers can at low cost switch to competitors. Hence, large multinationals have a strong interest in preserving their reputation and over time they tend to be a force for raising standards in developing countries (Oman, 2000) .
The key to the whole debate is that the race to the top regarding wage levels or environmental or social standards requires improved productivity. Otherwise the higher wages and the higher standards are not affordable. FDI is key here, because it tends to be among the more rapid ways of enhancing productivity and -when subject to effective competition -foreign investors will pass the resulting benefits to the host country via higher wages and/or better standards.
Social safety nets and service for the poor. While FDI has many features that help generate growth and raise wages and standards, it does not per se redistribute income towards the very poor. Social safety nets for the very poor and redistribution of assets and incomes towards them tend to require either important charitable activity or government intervention -not-for-profit intervention in both cases.
Foreign investment can often be important for creating the pre-conditions for such intervention. Foreign investors, by virtue of their productivity, can help generate the tax revenue required to fund assistance to the poor through their own tax contribution and indirectly by stimulating growth and thus broadening the tax base. They also often spend significant resources on community development in the areas that they operate in, so as to demonstrate that they are "good citizens", and they make important charitable contributions.
In addition to helping fund services for the poor foreign companies are often particularly well suited to actually deliver the services to the poor, because foreign direct investment combines the superior performance incentives of equity investors with advanced managerial and technical competence.
For example, the search for better service provided by private, often foreign, investors has characterized the world-wide shift to private provision of infrastructure during the 1990s. Foreign investors in telecommunications, electricity and water have brought more and improved service to millions of households including poor ones. Foreign investors do not shy away from serving poor or remote customers. The key to reach the poor is simply opening up entry into service provision by private companies. 
III. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR BENEFICIAL FDI
Openness to foreign investment is a strategy that has many potential benefits for poverty reduction. As has been pointed out, many countries have indeed been able to reap many of these benefits. However, the benefits do not flow quite automatically. Foreign investors are fallible people just like any others and they need to operate under the right conditions to bring out the good side of FDI. Otherwise they might be tempted to indulge in corrupt and socially detrimental activities jus t as domestic firms do. Examples of such behavior figure prominently in critiques of FDI.
Even and competitive playing field. Most importantly, the benefits from FDI tend to be maximized when foreign investors operate on an even and competitive playing field. This means they need to be treated just like domestic companies ("national treatment"). In addition, competition, free entry, customer choice and free exit, should determine who gains and who loses. In particular, foreign investors trying to service the domestic market of the host country should not be protected from import competition. China would in many ways appear the exception to the rule. A lot of foreign investment went into the country despite a less than perfect policy environment. However, in the case of China the special relationship of key provinces that received a large part of foreign investment, Guangdong and Fujian with Chinese communities outside the mainland did much to make up for existing distortions in the playing field. Moreover, China could clearly enhance the contribution of foreign investment through further policy reform (OECD, 2000) .
Exposure to effective competition on an even playing field is the single most important incentive for foreign and domestic companies to upgrade management and technology. Existence of significant market power risks reducing the incentives of foreign investors to improve productivity and to exploit consumers or workers in captive markets. Free entry is also the key to establishing effective linkages between foreign investors and domestic buyers or suppliers that help diffuse best practice in the economy. Domestic capability to exploit FDI. While a competitive and even playing field creates incentives to upgrade productivity throughout the economy, countries also need domestic actors capable of responding to these incentives. Various studies suggest that higher quality of the labor force and infrastructure in a country helps exploit the potential benefits from FDI (Borenzstein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998; Caves, 1999; Djankov and Hoekman, 1998; Mody and Wang, 1997) . Key policy responses will often be measures to improve education and infrastructure. In addition, foreign investors will themselves invest in upgrading domestic capability, for example via on-the-job training or the creation of physical infrastructure, for example by mining companies.
Adjusting environmental and social standards . Finally, as globalization gradually leads to the establishment of more international standards for environmental and social aspects of foreign investment, governments need to adjust their own policy design to fit into the evolving world of norms. If they do not adjust their own norms foreign investors may be forced to stay away out of reputational concerns or they may face too much competition from domestic firms not subject to stringent norms. On the other hand tougher standards have costs, which domestic firms may not be able to afford.
In that case domestic activity could suffer or be driven into uncontrolled or corrupt "informality". Analyses of how governments should position themselves to help match the drive for better corporate responsibility with effective growth at home are becoming increasingly important.
Prudent management of windfall gains from natural resources. Unsurprisingly, as for any investment, a basic pre-requisite for successful foreign investment is a stable macro-economic environment that allows investors to plan. A particular issue here are policies to deal with windfalls resulting from natural resources. Such windfalls resulting from oil, gas and mining projects have very often not lead to prosperity in the exporting country (Auty, 1993; Gelb, 1988; Sachs and Warner, 1995) . Large inflows of foreign exchange tend to raise the real exchange rate of an economy and thus render many non-mining activities unprofitable, the so-called "Dutch disease". In addition, the existence of large windfall gains provide incentives for many vested interests and new players to la y a hand on the gains in more or less legal ways. Corruption easily thrives under these conditions and scarce entrepreneurial talent is often diverted from productive pursuit to devising scams. The result is that many times windfalls have not benefited the poor and have even hurt them.
In many developing countries foreign investors manage the extraction and sale of minerals or fuels. Due to the problems sketched above, such foreign investment in enclave projects has often not been associated with growth and poverty reduction in the host country. The key for improvement are ways to manage the windfalls better. This would require prudent macro-economic policies to prevent excessive exchange rate appreciation and policies that minimize the opportunities of insiders for corruption. Countries that have been able to manage resource booms relatively well, albeit by no means perfectly, include Botswana, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico and Oman. The paper presents a new set of data on inequality in the distribution of income, based on Gini coefficients and on the shares of individual quintile groups in total income for a large number of developing countries.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The authors found that, for the 95 growth spells for which data on income shares were available, there was no systematic link between growth and inequality, but there was a strong positive relationship between growth and poverty alleviation. In particular, growth benefited the poor in the vast majority (87.5 percent) of cases, whereas economic decline hurt the poor disproportionately (in five out of seven cases). Dollar, David, and Aart Kraay. 2000. "Growth is Good for the Poor." Development Research Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
The study investigates the link between the income of the poor (defined as the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution) and overall income (per capita GDP). The data consists of income of the poor and mean income for 80 countries over 40 years. The study further examines the poverty -growth relationship in cases of poor countries versus rich countries, crisis periods versus normal growth periods, and the recent period compared to earlier times. It also introduces other institutions and policies into the analysis and asks whether these influence the extent to which growth benefits the poor.
The basic finding is that as overall income increases, on average incomes of the poor increase by exactly the same rate. None of the efforts to divide the data points into different groups changes the basic relationship between incomes of the poor and growth. As for the impact of policies and institutions, it is shown that openness to international trade as well as improvement in rule of law (e.g. property rights) raise incomes of the poor by raising overall per capita GDP but do not significantly influence the distribution of income. Policies that introduce fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability, however, are found not only to raise the overall incomes, but also to have an additional income distribution effect. The paper reviews the progress made in recent decades in raising real incomes and alleviating poverty in developing countries and comments on the policy implications.
The paper finds that the progress in raising real incomes and alleviating poverty has been disappointingly slow in many developing countries and the relative gap between the richest and the poorest countries has continued to widen. In Africa, the level of real per capita income today is lower than it was 30 years ago. More broadly, the number of very poor (those living on less than one $1 per day) has remained roughly unchanged over the past decade, and only limited progress has been made in reducing the share of the world population living in poverty. This represents both huge amounts of unnecessary human suffering and an enormous squandering of human potential. The paper argues that the bulk of development research reveals neither a unique set of preconditions that are always present during economic takeoff nor an easily identified set of impediments that have prevented poor countries from achieving sustained growth. There is no single formula for kick-starting growth, and it is more likely that the explanation The growth of average income for the poorest 20% and the poorest 40% of the population are regressed against the growth of GDP per capita.
The results indicate that on average the poor do benefit from economic growth. An increase in the rate of per capita GDP growth translates into a one-forone increase in average income of the poorest 40%. For the poorest 20%, the elasticity of response is 0.921. Another conclusion of the study is that income distribution changes only very slowly, and that a policy that aims at redistributing income at the expense of economic growth may have very low payoffs in terms of poverty reduction. Using Deininger-Squire data on income distribution for 27 developing countries, the paper estimates the impact of average per capita income growth on the growth of per capita income of each income quintile.
The paper finds that the distribution of income for the countries in the data sample worsened during the process of economic growth; the elasticity of overall growth and the growth in the per capita income of the poorest quintile was only 0.8 (and significantly less than one) and rose steadily to slightly greater than one for the richest quintile. The paper argues that the apparent failure of growth to reach the poor in the countries with wide income gaps, while disappointing, should not be taken as a general indictment of economic growth itself. The paper calls for visible and pro-active measures to reach the poor so as to sustain growth-friendly reforms. This book is a synthesis of evidence from literature on FDI that suggests the need for a new agenda for host governments.
FDI and Economic Growth
The author reviews three separate sets of assessments of the impact of FDI covering 183 project s in some 30 countries over more than 15 years. The results of these assessments show that a majority of the projects (55 percent to 75 percent) usually had a positive impact on the host national income, but a large minority of the projects (25 percent to 45 percent) had a clearly negative impact on the economic welfare of the host. The difference between positive and negative impacts was accounted for by policy variables that the host authorities could control. The author suggests a new policy agenda tow ard FDI which entails avoiding the use of domestic-content, joint-venture and technology -licensing requirements. The paper reviews the types of institutions that allow markets to perform and to promote growth.
AUTHORS
METHODOLOGY MAIN FINDINGS
The paper concludes that while the institutions that allow markets to perform adequately can be identified in broad terms, there is no unique mapping between markets and the nonmarket institutions that underpin them. The paper emphasizes the importance of "local knowledge," and argues that a strategy of institution building must not over-emphasize best-practice "blueprints" at the expense of experimentation. Participatory political systems are the most effective ones in processing and aggregating local knowledge. A range of evidence indicates that participatory democracy enables higher-quality growth. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1998. "More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus." The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, Helsinki, Finland, January 7, 1998. This is a discussion of the failures of the "Washington consensus" as well as a discussion of the emerging consensus or the so-called "postWashington consensus" on what makes markets work well and what are the instruments that promote well-functioning markets.
Making markets work requires more than just low inflation; it requires sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology and to encourage transparency. The East Asian crisis was not a refutation of the East Asian miracle. The problem was that governments underestimated the importance of financial regulation and corporate governance. It remains a fact that no other region in the world has ever had incomes rise so dramatically and seen so many people move out of poverty in such a short time. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1998. "Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and Processes." Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, Geneva, October 19, 1998. This is a discussion of how in recent years there has been increasing attention paid, within the World Bank and the development community, to issues of health and education, literacy rates and life expectancy, the importance of economic security and creation of safety nets, and the promotion of democratic, equitable, and sustainable development.
It is in the interest of developing countries to become fully involved in the global economy through trade and through attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Development is not just a matter of technical adjustments, but a transformation of society. Both trade and FDI play important roles in this area. However, it is crucial that trade and FDI not be confined to small enclaves, even if those enclaves give a temporary boost to national output (e.g. a wealth of gold resources away from the country's population base may attract FDI and boost mineral exports, but it may do little for long-term development). The capital that enters a country through FDI typically comes in with management expertise, technical human capital, product and process technologies, and overseas marketing channels. If the host country puts in place the appropriate complementary policies and structures, FDI can give a boost to the technological level and growth of that country. The fears about FDI in the 1960s and 1970 were based largely on the notion of FDI as an enclave phenomenon. In its modern incarnation, FDI is something to attract, not to fear. With the growing international competition among multinationals, foreign corporations receive fewer monopoly rents and the host countries get a larger share of the benefits from investment. As the experience of the recent financial crisis The increases in income were matched by improvements in living standards, increases in life expectancy, and a reduction by half in the number of people living in absolute poverty over a two-decade period. Countries in the region should therefore not step back from openness to the outside world, especially to ideas and knowledge, investment capital, and competition; but at the same time they must not ignore the structural weaknesses that contributed to their vulnerability. They must also avoid subjecting themselves to the risks of short-term capital flows. Vernon, Raymond. 1998 An analysis of the role of multinationals in the globalizing economy.
Despite the cordial relationship between governments and multinational enterprises, there is an inherent tension between the two that needs to be addressed. The world is likely to go through a long period of learning as nation states search for proper responses to the problems of openness. During that period, multinational enterprises will be vulnerable to the accusation that they are the prime cause of those problems. The author calls for restraint from leaders on both sides of this struggle. The behavior of short-term investment appears to be sensitive to changes in all the other types of international capital flows, but direct investment appears to be insensitive to such changes.
Volatility of FDI Relative to Other Capital Flows
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Eichengreen, Barry. 2000. "Taming Capital Flows." World Development.
28(6).
The paper discusses how to cope with high capital mobility and how to proceed with capital market liberalization.
The author suggests the opening of inward foreign investment early in the process of liberalizing the capital account. As of 1996, 144 of 184 countries surveyed by the IMF had not eased controls on FDI. The author argues that one of the factors contributing to the Korean crisis was the fact that the government had been reluctant to allow inward FDI but that under foreign pressure opened other components of the capital account. In the case of Thailand, even though the lifting of restrictions on inward FDI did not help prevent the crisis, the problem was that the capital account was also opened to portfolio flows without the presence of a strong financial system. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2000. "Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability." World Development. 28(6).
The paper reviews the arguments for capital market liberalization and suggests intervention in short-term capital flows.
Foreign direct investment brings with it not only resources, but technology, access to markets, and training. Foreign direct investment is also not as volatile and disruptive as short-term capital flows. In the case of East Asia as a whole, the turnaround in capital flows during 1996-97 amounted to $105 billion, more than 10% of the GDP of these economies. This study uses cross-country comparisons to explain why the hard mineral economies have performed less well than the developing countries as a whole.
Economic Growth and Natural Resource Windfalls
Mineral production in developing countries is strongly capital intensive and employs a small fraction of the total national workforce with large inputs of capital from foreign sources. Consequently, the mining sector displays marked enclave tendencies. This means that few local factories are established to supply inputs or to further process the ore prior to export. The insulation of the non-mining tradeables from import competition makes it especially difficult to generate the foreign exchange and tax revenues needed to substitute for those lost from mining during a mineral downswing. The mining sector also displays low revenue retention since a large fraction of ex port earnings flow immediately overseas to service the foreign capital investment. The cause of the underperformance of the hard mineral economies, therefore, lies not so much in a lack of investment resources as in the inefficiency with which those investment resources were deployed. Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 1995 The paper examines the validity of the "efficient grease" hypothesis, according to which corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery would be counter-productive.
The paper finds that contrary to the "efficient greas e" hypothesis, firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital. By way of policy implications, the paper suggests that the business community as a whole can benefit from international laws that strengthen their ability to credibly commit to no-bribery, even if an individual firm may find it otherwise optimal to bribe in a corrupt environment. Smarzynska, Beata K., and Shang-Jin The paper studies the impact of corruption in a host country on foreign investors' preferences for a joint venture versus a wholly-owned subsidiary.
In a simple model, the paper highlights the basic trade-off in using local partners. On the one hand, corruption makes local bureaucracy less transparent and increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze. On the other hand, corruption decreases the effective protection of the investors' intangible assets and lowers the probability that disputes between foreign and domestic partners will be adjudicated fairly, which reduces the v alue of having a local partner. The importance of protecting intangible assets increases with the investor's technological sophistication. Empirical tests of the hypothesis on a firm-level data set show that corruption reduces inward FDI and shifts the ownership structure toward joint ventures. Technologically more advanced firms are found to be less likely to engage in joint ventures. However, US firms are found to be more averse to joint ventures in corrupt countries than investors of other nationalities. This may be due to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Wei, Shang-Jin. In a sample of 14 countries making bilateral investments in 45 host countries, the study investigates whether corruption ("grease money") helps to attract foreign investment
The study f inds no robust support in the data for the "efficient grease" hypothesis. Instead, the paper finds that taxes, capital controls, and corruption all have large, statistically significant
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Paper 2209. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
helps to attract foreign investment by reducing foreign firms' tax burden and provide them with relief from capital controls.
all have large, statistically significant negative effects on foreign direct investment. Bureaucratic corruption adds to the burdens of taxes and capital controls rather than reduces them. The probability that a domestic plant exports is positively correlated with proximity to MNC affiliates, even when other factors such as overall industrial activity, capital city proximity,and so on, are controlled for. Export propensity is uncorrelated with the concentration of exporters generally. This suggests that export spillovers are restricted to MNC activity, with affiliates being a natural conduit for information about foreign markets and technology, and so on. Barrel, Ray, and Nigel Pain. 1997. "Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, and Economic Growth within Europe." The Economic Journal . 107: 1770-1786. This study estimates the efficiency spillover from FDI for the UK and West Germany.
FDI, Linkages and Spillovers
Each 1 per cent rise in the stock of inward investment raised laboraugmenting efficiency by 0.27% over the period 1972-95 in West Germany, and by 0.26% in the UK (manufacturing sector only). For the UK, therefore, inward FDI over 1985-95 seemed to raise manufacturing output by 12.5% or 1.2% per year, accounting for 30% of the growth of the UK manufacturing sector over the ten year period. Batra, Geeta, and Hong Tan. 2000.
Interfirm Linkages and Productivity Growth: Evidence from Malaysian
Manufacturing. Washington DC: World Bank.
The study investigates the relationship between interfirm linkages and productivity growth using evidence from Malaysian manufacturing.
Foreign firms in Malaysia are more likely (than local large firms) to subcontract to foreign and local suppliers, and rely more heavily on the latter. Production function results show that "having any subcontracting links with other firms is associated with higher productivity, a relationship that is large, positive and statistically significant." Subcontractors were 45% less productive when they first became suppliers compared to the survey point
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suppliers compared to the survey point -in other words, the productivity disadvantage diminishes over time. Batra, Geeta, and Hong Tan. 1997. Malaysia: Enterprise Training, Technology and Productivity. Washington DC: World Bank.
The study investigates the productivity effect of employeesponsored and other training programs using data from a survey of 2200 companies.
The major finding is that the productivity of local firms lags behind that of foreign affiliates because local firms invest relatively less in training and new technology. Affiliates do less R&D than local firms suggesting technology can be effectively acquired through licensing agreements and technology embodied in new equipment. Bende-Nabende, Anthony. 1998. "A Static Analysis of the Impact of FDI on the Host Developing Countries' Economic Growth: A Case for the ASEAN-5 Economies." Paper presented at the ESRC Conference 'Finance and Development', Birmingham, UK, September 7-8, 1998. Mimeo.
The paper investigates whether FDI has caused spillover effects that have led to economic growth of the ASEAN-5 economies over the period 1970-94. The article also has an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on employment, human capital formation, technology transfer and growth.
FDI has stimulated economic growth by spilling mainly through its impact on workforce training and skill-upgrading, followed by technology transfer, international trade and learning by doing. FDI has created incentives for human skills improvement, and governments have played an important role in the process of improving human skill quality through "formal" channels. The study investigates the production function for manufacturing companies in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe in the early 1990s.
Both foreign ownership and technology transfer are found to have a significant impact on firm efficiency. Both increase value added by 30% for the sample as a whole, and by over 60% in Ghana. The study investigates the impact of firm-based training and investments in technology on enterprise productivity in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, using 1992-3 RPED Survey data.
The main finding is that 56% of foreignowned firms conduct in-house training of employees, compared with 17% for domestic firms. The paper investigates the effect of FDI on economic growth in a crosscountry regression framework using FDI flow data to 69 developing countries for 1970-89.
Results show that FDI is an important vehicle for the diffusion of technology contributing relatively more to growth than domestic investment, but the result holds only w hen there is some threshold stock of human capital. FDI has the effect of increasing total investment by more than one for one suggesting complementary rather than substituting effects of FDI (in other words a "crowding-in" effect). FDI has a statistically insignificant impact on total factor productivity growth. Sectors with a higher foreign presence had a lower dispersion of productivity amongst all firms, suggesting that there may be spillovers that moved local firms closer to the productivity frontier. Hong, Kyttack. 1997 . "Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in Korea: 1970 ." Journal of Economic Development. 22(1): 79-89.
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The author analyzes the contribution of various types of foreign capital to growth of Korean industries in , by modeling the productivity elasticities of FDI, commercial loans and public loans.
The findings suggest the importance of FDI, accounting for perhaps 20% of manufacturing growth, despite low levels of FDI during the period and a preference for technology licensing. The authors extend previous Barrel and Pain (1997) analysis to test for compositional effects -Does FDI raise productivity in the UK / West Germany without producing spillover effects?
FDI raises productivity through spillover effects, indeed FDI produces an effect almost four times larger for common long run elasticity of labor-augmenting efficiency than other firms. Indigenous business tends to grow up around export-oriented operations established by foreigners. In the countries studied, foreigners seem to be responsible for early surges in exports but are subsequently overtaken by indigenous companies as a proportion of total exports (although foreigner share continues to grow in absolute terms). In electrical machinery, for example, US and Japanese affiliates accounted for over half of exports in 1977, but only 22 per cent in the mid-1990s, indicating a "maturing of the domestic industry." In faster changing industries (high tech) foreign affiliates share has changed less. Although direct employment effects were not large (600 MNEs employed just over 180,000 persons, which was 0.7% of the total labor f orce or 8.8% of total employment in the manufacturing sector in 1985), it was estimated that over 400,000 jobs were generated by foreign firms through their backward linkages to other sectors. Furthermore, the MNE's played an important role in improving the production processes of local subcontractors through the diffusion of training practices from foreign to local firms. Sjöholm, Frederik. 1999 The authors monitored and evaluated 25 projects (case studies) using four indicators: taxes/duties paid, exports generated, number of new jobs directly created, and total investment facilitated.
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The results showed improvements in various projects: increased number and wages of employees; increased employment opportunities for women, and provision of training to upgrade skills. This is a case study using an environmental cost -benefit analysis (soiling and material damage, health, global effects of SO2 and NO2 emissions, and so on) of a private sector project. Kunda, a cement factory in Estonia, was selected because prior to its privatization it was a heavy polluter.
FDI and Wages
Foreign investment to reduce air pollution at the Kunda cement factory would, once fully implemented, result in significant net economic benefits. The most important benefits identified are: Reduced global effects of SO2 and NO2 emissions, better health costs, reduced soiling and material damage, and increased forestry and agricultural yields. Martin, Will, and Keith E. Maskus. 1999 The study develops an analytical framework to map potential linkages between FDI and the environment, including micro-level decisions such as industry location and firm environmental performance and micro-level impacts on eco-systems, indigenous cultures, income and consumption. It also summarizes and evaluates statistical and case study evidence.
Although there is no evidence of a "race to the bottom" the absence of a global regulatory framework for the environment has inhibited a "race to the top." To date, governments have exhibited little determination to support social regulation of investment at either the global or regional level. Rather, there has been an emphasis on corporate "self regulation" through voluntary systems such as ISO 14000 and codes of conduct. There is no evidence to support the "pollution haven" argument, but clearly some countries and subnational regions contain firms (foreign and domestic) that perform worse, and where regulation is less effective. The propensity of businesses to pollute is generally associated with their age rather than the foreign or domestic nature of ownership.
